I, Economist

The Greeks used the words oikos for house and nomos for law which would eventually be combined to reflect philosophies which would evolve from the writings in the Muqaddimah, written by the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun in 1377. Mercantilists and physiocrats would eventually arise in Europe, becoming known as economists, studying the separate discipline of economics with the publishing of Adam Smith’s quintessential work The Wealth of Nations in 1776. A discipline falling within the purview of the larger study of business, it is formally considered a social science studying production, distribution, and consumption of goods.

When I was previously in school for one of my business degrees I categorized the three business sub-disciplines of accounting, finance, and economics into what I dubbed “Matthew’s Levels of Money” such that each of the fields dealt with money at different levels: Accounting deals with the simple “accounting” of funds inasmuch as making sure what money is where; economics deals with the greater movements of such things through groups of businesses, industries, markets, national economies, and larger systems. Finance deals with money flowing in intermediate systems, between the scales which accounting and economics covers. Lastly, I posed that there were areas in which accounting merged with finance and where finance and economics merged as fields of study.

While finance and accounting are all well and good, economics, at least to me, is the physics of the business world. Physics is the study of the relationship between matter and energy, one of the fundamental sciences on which everything else in the universe can be understood and is built upon. Economics is a business and social field of study which can shed immense amounts of light onto many things, not just those that involve money, distribution, or production.

For instance, when observing behaviors of others, the economist understands that people are apt to do one of two things: Seek pleasure and avoid pain. Put another way, one needs to find the incentive in the actions of individuals or groups thereof to understand their stated or unstated intentions. People speed in their cars along their route between points A and B because there is a perceived incentive that they would rather be at point B rather than either of the other alternatives. People cheat on their taxes because there is the perceived incentive that they will not have to pay as much money to the Internal Revenue Service or that they will get more money in tax refunds. They may be honest because that makes them feel good, or they may tell lies because they feel that there is an incentive in being perceived a different way than what reality would otherwise dictate: People chasing the incentive is a powerful tool.

A concept in economics which is closely related to a person’s incentive to do something is one that is old as the science itself: Utility. It is essentially defined as the degree of usefulness which a person assesses to a situation, product, or anything involving choice; classical economics dictates that each person should be maximizing utility in any situation involving choice. While practicality is often what textbooks teach in regards to how utility is measured, this can vary based on culture or any one of a multitude of other factors. For instance, companies have a tendency to use Canada as a test market, as opposed to the United States, because Canadians tend to attach more practicality to their measure of utility and Americans tend to attach more status or prestige to their perceived utility in a decision, such as one to purchase a product. Put another way, Canadians will buy the test pizza at a fast food chain restaurant because they find it convenient or tasty. Americans will purchase the pizza because it is the cool thing to do that week.

Economics is a versatile science which allows the practitioner to look at the details of a given situation or the big picture. From the intelligent interactions between agents to the dynamics of national economies, economists rely on data and an understanding of the geometry of a given situation. Calculated, the economist is an effective decision maker that can sort through and process large amounts of information and think effectively on their feet.

In the art of corporate warfare, the economist is an able participant and a lethal combatant. Even in the hands of any other member of the business team, a firm understanding of economics will make one’s effectiveness that much more potent.

Clauswitz's Corporate Warfare: Axioms, Principles, Definitions

AXIOMS AND PRINCIPLES

The Subjectivity Axiom: Leaders may easily misjudge or lose control of passions (subjective impulses) on their own side.

• Their opponents have similar such uncertainties as well as wills and creativity of their own.

Entropic Principle: “Friction," stemming from corporate warfare's uncertainty, chance, suffering, confusion, exhaustion, and fear.

• Effects of time, space, and human nature
• Fundamental and unavoidable force
• Events take time to unfold, with all that that implies
• Even the wisest order is subject to loss, delay, misinterpretation, poor execution, or willful disobedience
• Lack of good intelligence information
• Every individual human being is a friction-producing cog in the machine of war
• It is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results

Other Notes on Entropy of Corporate Warfare:

• Corporate Warfare is dangerous with inherent risks, and danger (physical, moral, emotional, mental, etc.) has an impact on the behavior of the participants.

"Butterfly Effect": "a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can transform storm systems next month in New York."

The Russian Winter Principle:

Given that the defender has enough time and resources in which to recover, the aggressor will inevitably reach a point at which he or she must take up the defense. If the business unit pushes too far, the equilibrium will shift against that unit. The aggressor, in his or her own retreat (often through devastated territory), cannot draw on the defender's usual resources, from which he or she draws strength.

TERMINOLOGY

Corporate Warfare is the utilization of one firm’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to exploit those of other firms.

Value: The return from sale or trade of a good or service; in priority order

1) Monetary or material worth;

2) Worth in usefulness or importance to the possessor; utility or merit;

3) A principle, standard, or quality considered worthwhile or desirable;

Marketplace Violence:

• Force exerted for the purpose of damaging share
• To deprive the competitor of something valuable by force
• Intensity or severity, as in natural phenomena in the marketplace
• Vehemence of tactic or other expression; fervor

Manage:

• To direct or control the use of; handle; to exert control over
• To direct the affairs or interests of:
• To succeed in accomplishing or achieving, especially with difficulty; arrange

Therefore, the key components of managers is to maximize the value of the firm

Complexity Theory: Used in analyzing systems in which there are numerous unknown variables, such that it is used in calculating or developing algorithm (e.g. processes) to define what those variables are, or to otherwise assign “nice” boundaries, contexts, or operating parameters to.

Nonlinear Systems Theory: The theory that objects, situations, markets, industries, or other events or systems appear different when viewed from different angles or perspectives. It can also be defined as the simple departure from linear—that is, step-by-step procedures—involved in events and making decisions surrounding their further development and outcome.

“Genius of Corporate Warfare”

• Hinges on willpower more so than other individual elements
• An iron will and a powerful sense of purpose are indispensable in overcoming the forces of entropy in corporate warfare
• To some extent the causes of this difficulty are simply inherent of any large organization

Strength: The ability to be powerfully effective

The following conditions must exist for strength to be present, in priority order:

1) Capable of exerting a high amount of force

2) In good or sound health; robust

3) Capable of the effective exercise of authority

4) Economically or financially sound or thriving

5) Having force of character, will, morality, or intelligence

6) Having or showing ability or achievement in a specified field

7) Capable of withstanding great force or wear; or excellent binding or espirit de corps

8) Not easily upset

9) Having force or rapidity of motion

10) Intense in degree or quality

Offense: The act of attacking or assaulting through the utilization of tactics and strategy

Defense: The act or method of defending or protecting against attack, danger, or loss

Corporate Warfare ala Clauswitz: Some Key Points

Corporate Warfare is the utilization of one firm’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to exploit those of other firms.

Strategic Concepts of Corporate Warfare according to von Clauswitz

War (as opposed to strategy or tactics) is neither an art nor a science

• The object of science is knowledge and certainty
• The object of art is creative ability

Therefore,

• Clauswitz refers to war as a form of “social intercourse”
• Possessing bases in both science and art
• He likens it to commerce or litigation, but more usually to politics
• Interpretation: Corporate warfare is extremely multidisciplinary

Although,

• In both art and science, the actor is working on inanimate matter
• In business, politics, and war the actor's will is directed at an animate object that not only reacts but takes independent actions of its own.

Thus,

• Corporate Warfare is thus permeated by "intelligent forces."
• Or, "an act of force to compel our [opposition[ to do our will."

Corporate warfare is, then, a contest between independent wills

von Clauswitz described war in two contexts, laying a theoretical and applied frameworks.

"Absolute War" – [Corporate] War[fare] in it’s purest form.

• A philosophical abstraction
• War in a "pure" form
• Unrestrained by intelligent forces or by the frictional effects of time, space, and human nature
• maximum effort
• Uter overthrow of the enemy

"Real war"—[Corporate] War[fare] in it’s applied form.

• The gritty reality of warfare as we actually experience it
• Constrained by the ever-present social, political, industrial, and market-based context, by human nature, and by the restrictions imposed by time and space

Real War ≠ Absolute War

The spectrum of war does not run smoothly from "absolute" to that of "limited” warfare

• Real war occurs along this spectrum, the “force spectrum”
• From the mere threat of force
• To conflicts which are
• Unlimited in the sense that at least one of the antagonists is unwilling to accept any outcome other than the complete overthrow of his adversary.

Interpretation: As are the factors that comprise the winning of a war are many, as are the conditions under which a war is won. A corporate leader in corporate warfare must broaden what they consider winning and losing, and define it clearly.

• The conduct of corporate warfare has to vary in accordance with its commercial purposes
• A party resorting to corporate warfare should do so with a clear idea as to what it means to accomplish and how it intends to proceed toward that goal

"[Corporate] War [fare] is a continuation of [corporate policy] by other means."

The practice of business is the ability to organize resources to conduct commerce.

Whereas,

Commerce: The buying and selling of goods, especially on a large scale, as between cities or nations.

Manage:

• To direct or control the use of; handle; to exert control over
• To direct the affairs or interests of:
• To succeed in accomplishing or achieving, especially with difficulty; arrange

Therefore,

The key job of managers is to maximize the value of the firm

• Improve the situation of the firm which they represent.

Corporate Warfare is a method of—not a substitute for—conducting commerce.

• An expression or method of commerce, but
• Commerce is the interplay of conflicting forces, not the execution of one-sided policy initiatives.

In corporate warfare, commerce and management remain in all their complexity, with the added element of “marketplace violence”.

Marketplace violence: The irrational and non-rational forces that affect and often drive commerce have the same impact on corporate warfare.

"Strategy" is therefore the collective use of tactics for the purpose of corporate warfare or "the [commercial] purpose of the warfare being waged

• No strategic decision is ever final; it can always be reversed in another round of struggle.
• Further, a war often takes on a dynamic beyond the intentions of those who launched it.

The conduct of corporate warfare always rests on the variable energies, abilities, interests, and character of the stakeholders of the firm in unpredictable proportions.

Complex Systems in Corporate Warfare

"Physicists like to think that all you have to do is say, these are the conditions, now what happens next?"
—Richard P. Feynman

The flow of events in corporate warfare is uniquely shaped by the specifics of every situation…the course of warfare is never entirely predictable.

The entrance of complex systems analysis into Corporate Warfare:

• Inherent complexity theory and nonlinear systems theory
• "Butterfly Effect": "a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can transform storm systems next month in New York."

Complexity Theory: Used in analyzing systems in which there are numerous unknown variables, such that it is used in calculating or developing algorithm (e.g. processes) to define what those variables are, or to otherwise assign “nice” boundaries, contexts, or operating parameters to.

Nonlinear Systems Theory: The theory that objects, situations, markets, industries, or other events or systems appear different when viewed from different angles or perspectives. It can also be defined as the simple departure from linear—that is, step-by-step procedures—involved in events and making decisions surrounding their further development and outcome.

Most market phenomena are generally nonlinear in nature.

• Financial Markets (nonlinear adaptive evolutionary systems)
• Pricing strategies for market segments (correlated multidimensional type)
• Production Possibilities Frontier, or PPF (nonlinear tendencies)

Clauswitz on a Decisive-Force Victory:

“Events [of Corporate Warfare] are proof that success is not due simply to general causes. Particular factors can often be decisive—details known only to those who were on the spot. There can also be moral factors which never come to light; while issues can be decided by chances and incidents so minute as to figure in histories simply as anecdotes.”

Interpretation & Analysis:

• Victory is often decided on the tactical scale, and not on the strategic
• Requires proper training of supervisory and middle-level managers
• Psychological/Morals-based
• The “subjective art” to corporate warfare; basing maneuvers on principle
• Victory is detail-oriented
• The most true contest in corporate warfare is one that occurs between near-equals
• In struggles between opponents markedly unequal in terms of resources available, general factors tend to be (but are not necessarily) more decisive
• The greatest familiarity with the most correct theory does not permit the decision-maker to skip the details.

The Levels of the Corporate Warfare Force Continuum

Three general classifications herein:

1. Primordial

• The people involved begin to exhibit “blind natural force,” or intentionally subjecting you or your business unit to hatred or hostility

2. Probability

• The manager or collective business unit involved utilize chance, probability, and creative spirit

3. Subordination

• As an instrument of corporate policy, originating from senior management,

Although, let it be stated that raw strength is not to be despised in exclusive favor of clever stratagems:

"The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. If one side uses force without reluctance, undeterred by the upset to both sides which it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper hand."

Therefore, one should not hesitate. Do not forget that there is no substitute for sound planning.

One may take from this, also, that it is alright not to go into a corporate battle with the utmost resources, human and otherwise, available to them. It is not necessary that the victor would necessarily be the side with the most employees with which to fight and win the battles; but that there is no excuse for going into a corporate campaign with less than the maximum available power.

Essentials of Corporate Warfare

"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority of numbers is the most common element in victory."
--Carl von Clauswitz, On War

“Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to…defeat [a competitor] without too much [harm done], and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of [corporate warfare]. Pleasant as it [may sound], it is a fallacy that must be exposed: [corporate warfare] is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect.”

Interpretation:

• Corporate warfare is not for the weak
• Don’t try to lessen or dampen the effects of certain actions on the opponent
• Kindness creates mistakes of the worst variety
• Maximum force requires maximum intellect

Essentials of Offense and Defense

Offense increases strength, which is produced by conquest

Defense increases the level or ability of self-preservation

Defensive measures are often undertaken by the weaker opponent; entrenchments and fixed fortifications are among the strongest forms of a good defense, tactically; but they should not be relied upon heavily. The defender is able, though; to more easily draw on its sources of strength, especially under fortification.

Historically, the defender has been able to choose the grounds for battle

The essence of defending is waiting to see what the aggressor’s intentions will be. To master defense is being able to see when the aggressor has exhausted his or her resources, and then exploit that opportunity. An active defense, while being perceived as passivity by the aggressor, and as an aggression of well-directed blows by the defender is what is necessary to mastering the art of defense. Defense is only done with the intent of moving into the offense; shifting from defender to aggressor.

Public opinion is more likely to favor the strategic defender—significant conquests by one contender will threaten all remaining possible opponents and affect the public in a negative fashion if the information is not “spun” correctly. Even so, the general public may look upon the firm on the offense negatively, while they look upon the “little guy,” that is, the smaller or defensive firm, in a positive light. This is particularly true in U.S. and European cultures.

Offensively, there should be emphasis placed on the pursuit, which permits the infliction of disproportionate losses on the loser of corporate combat.

Keep in mind, however strongly an offensive may start out, inevitably it must weaken as it advances from its original base.

The aggressor’s force is degraded by the needs to provide garrisons, to maintain the lines of supply and communications, and the greater physical strain on troops in the attack.

Every offensive, however victorious, has a "culminating point,” a point in which it is able to reach it’s natural critical mass.

The Russian Winter Principle: Given that the defender has enough time and resources in which to recover, the aggressor will inevitably reach a point at which he or she must take up the defense. If the business unit pushes too far, the equilibrium will shift against that unit. The aggressor, in his or her own retreat (often through devastated territory), cannot draw on the defender's usual resources, from which he or she draws strength.

Conclusions on Offense and Defense

The first rule is therefore to enter the field with a force as strong as possible. This sounds very like a commonplace, but still it is really not so.

The second rule, then, is to enter the battlefield with a force that is led by the most intellectually sound corporate leader who has a strong grasp of the strategic; with subordinate managers that have strong grasps on the tactical.

Strength: The ability to be powerfully effective

The following conditions must exist for strength to be present, in priority order:

1) Capable of exerting a high amount of force

2) In good or sound health; robust

3) Capable of the effective exercise of authority

4) Economically or financially sound or thriving

5) Having force of character, will, morality, or intelligence

6) Having or showing ability or achievement in a specified field

7) Capable of withstanding great force or wear; or excellent binding or espirit de corps

8) Not easily upset

9) Having force or rapidity of motion

10) Intense in degree or quality

Clauswitz, The General

The following is a short memoir of the Prussian General Carl von Clauswitz taken from the forward of a non-copyrighted translation of his magnus opus On War. On War continues to be the basis for western military thought and strategy.

General Carl Von Clausewitz, was born at Burg, near Magdeburg, in 1780, and entered the Prussian Army as Fahnenjunker (i.e., ensign) in 1792. He served in the campaigns of 1793-94 on the Rhine, after which he seems to have devoted some time to the study of the scientific branches of his profession. In 1801 he entered the Military School at Berlin, and remained there till 1803. During his residence there he attracted the notice of General Scharnhorst, then at the head of the establishment; and the patronage of this distinguished officer had immense influence on his future career, and we may gather from his writings that he ever afterwards continued to entertain a high esteem for Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served as Aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia; and being wounded and taken prisoner, he was sent into France until the close of that war. On his return, he was placed on General Scharnhorst’s Staff, and employed in the work then going on for the reorganisation of the Army. He was also at this time selected as military instructor to the late King of Prussia, then Crown Prince. In 1812 Clausewitz, with several other Prussian officers, having entered the Russian service, his first appointment was as Aide-de-camp to General Phul. Afterwards, while serving with Wittgenstein’s army, he assisted in negotiating the famous convention of Tauroggen with York. Of the part he took in that affair he has left an interesting account in his work on the “Russian Campaign.” It is there stated that, in order to bring the correspondence which had been carried on with York to a termination in one way or another, the Author was despatched to York’s headquarters with two letters, one was from General d'Auvray, the Chief of the Staff of Wittgenstein’s army, to General Diebitsch, showing the arrangements made to cut off York’s corps from Macdonald (this was necessary in order to give York a plausible excuse for seceding from the French); the other was an intercepted letter from Macdonald to the Duke of Bassano. With regard to the former of these, the Author says, “it would not have had weight with a man like York, but for a military justification, if the Prussian Court should require one as against the French, it was important.”

The second letter was calculated at the least to call up in General York’s mind all the feelings of bitterness which perhaps for some days past bad been diminished by the consciousness of his own behaviour towards the writer.

As the Author entered General York’s chamber, the latter called out to him, “Keep off from me; I will have nothing more to do with you; your d----d Cossacks have let a letter of Macdonald’s pass through them, which brings me an order to march on Piktrepohnen, in order there to effect our junction. All doubt is now at an end; your troops do not come up; you are too weak; march I must, and I must excuse myself from further negotiation, which may cost me my head.” The Author said that be would make no opposition to all this, but begged for a candle, as he had letters to show the General, and, as the latter seemed still to hesitate, the Author added, “Your Excellency will not surely place me in the embarrassment of departing without having executed my commission.” The General ordered candles, and called in Colonel von Roeder, the chief of his staff, from the ante-chamber. The letters were read. After a pause of an instant, the General said, “Clausewitz, you are a Prussian, do you believe that the letter of General d'Auvray is sincere, and that Wittgenstein’s troops will really be at the points he mentioned on the 31st?” The Author replied, “I pledge myself for the sincerity of this letter upon the knowledge I have of General d'Auvray and the other men of Wittgenstein’s headquarters; whether the dispositions he announces can be accomplished as he lays down I certainly cannot pledge myself; for your Excellency knows that in war we must often fall short of the line we have drawn for ourselves.” The General was silent for a few minutes of earnest reflection; then he held out his hand to the Author, and said, “You have me. Tell General Diebitsch that we must confer early to-morrow at the mill of Poschenen, and that I am now firmly determined to separate myself from the French and their cause.” The hour was fixed for 8 A.M. After this was settled, the General added, “But I will not do the thing by halves, I will get you Massenbach also.” He called in an officer who was of Massenbach’s cavalry, and who had just left them. Much like Schiller’s Wallenstein, he asked, walking up and down the room the while, “What say your regiments?” The officer broke out with enthusiasm at the idea of a riddance from the French alliance, and said that every man of the troops in question felt the same.

“You young ones may talk; but my older head is shaking on my shoulders,” replied the General. ["Campaign in Russia in 1812”; translated from the German of General Von Clausewitz – by Lord Ellesmere].

After the close of the Russian campaign Clausewitz remained in the service of that country, but was attached as a Russian staff officer to Blucher’s headquarters till the Armistice in 1813.

In 1814, he became Chief of the Staff of General Walmoden’s Russo-German Corps, which formed part of the Army of the North under Bernadotte. His name is frequently mentioned with distinction in that campaign, particularly in connection with the affair of Goehrde.

Clausewitz re-entered the Prussian service in 1815, and served as Chief of the Staff to Thielman’s corps, which was engaged with Grouchy at Wavre, on the 18th of June.

After the Peace, he was employed in a command on the Rhine. In 1818, he became Major-General, and Director of the Military School at which he had been previously educated.

In 1830, he was appointed Inspector of Artillery at Breslau, but soon after nominated Chief of the Staff to the Army of Observation, under Marshal Gneisenau on the Polish frontier.

The latest notices of his life and services are probably to be found in the memoirs of General Brandt, who, from being on the staff of Gneisenau’s army, was brought into daily intercourse with Clausewitz in matters of duty, and also frequently met him at the table of Marshal Gneisenau, at Posen.

Amongst other anecdotes, General Brandt relates that, upon one occasion, the conversation at the Marshal’s table turned upon a sermon preached by a priest, in which some great absurdities were introduced, and a discussion arose as to whether the Bishop should not be made responsible for what the priest had said. This led to the topic of theology in general, when General Brandt, speaking of himself, says, “I expressed an opinion that theology is only to be regarded as an historical process, as a MOMENT in the gradual development of the human race. This brought upon me an attack from all quarters, but more especially from Clausewitz, who ought to have been on my side, he having been an adherent and pupil of Kiesewetter’s, who had indoctrinated him in the philosophy of Kant, certainly diluted--I might even say in homoeopathic doses.” This anecdote is only interesting as the mention of Kiesewetter points to a circumstance in the life of Clausewitz that may have had an influence in forming those habits of thought which distinguish his writings.

“The way,” says General Brandt, “in which General Clausewitz judged of things, drew conclusions from movements and marches, calculated the times of the marches, and the points where decisions would take place, was extremely interesting. Fate has unfortunately denied him an opportunity of showing his talents in high command, but I have a firm persuasion that as a strategist he would have greatly distinguished himself. As a leader on the field of battle, on the other hand, he would not have been so much in his right place, from a manque d'habitude du commandement, he wanted the art d'enlever les troupes.”

After the Prussian Army of Observation was dissolved, Clausewitz returned to Breslau, and a few days after his arrival was seized with cholera, the seeds of which he must have brought with him from the army on the Polish frontier. His death took place in November 1831.

His writings are contained in nine volumes, published after his death, but his fame rests most upon the three volumes forming his treatise on War. In the present attempt to render into English this portion of the works of Clausewitz, the translator is sensible of many deficiencies, but he hopes at all events to succeed in making this celebrated treatise better known in England, believing, as he does, that so far as the work concerns the interests of this country, it has lost none of the importance it possessed at the time of its first publication.

Sun Tzu on Corporate Warfare: The Basics

Corporate warfare is the only means of growth for a firm.

There are Five Primary Factors in waging corporate warfare:

1. Corporate Culture is what causes the people to have the same thinking as their superiors.

§ The corporate leader is simply doing the will of the customer, as if he or she and they are the same entity.

§ There must be no fear of danger and betrayal by or from either the corporate officer, management or non-management employee

2. “Heaven” is the natural, uncontrollable forces related to the markets and it’s inherent segments, which may place constraints on operations

§ Traveling on a safe and easy route, as pertaining to the market environments

§ Must be flexible and able to adapt to sudden changes in environmental variables in the markets

§ Resources must be adequate to support a campaign under adverse variables

§ Support from staff elements must be effective and immediate

§ The leader must be well-trained and well-experienced to meet the needs of an ever-changing marketplace

§ There must be at least one strong leader in every business unit to urge and motivate their colleagues along

3. “Ground” is the natural, uncontrollable forces related to the industrial environment and other elements which may place constraints on operations

§ Traveling on a safe and easy route, as pertaining to the industrial environment

§ Must be flexible and able to adapt to sudden changes in environmental variables in the industry

§ Supplies and equipment need to be adequate.

§ The officers, managerial, and non-managerial employees must be well-trained to handle fluctuations in variables in the industrial environment

§ There must be at least one strong leader in every business unit to urge and motivate their colleagues along

4. The Corporate Leader displays the necessary traits of wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage, and discipline.

§ Wisdom is the quality of being able to make sound, logical decisions; perfected through years of study and experience.

§ Credibility is being able to gain the trust of others through dependable and consistent demeanor; as a leader’s word carries much weight and it makes for an easier task of rallying those subordinate to the Corporate Leader

§ Benevolence is the intentions of the corporate leader always being focused on doing things beneficial for his or her subordinates, the firm, and utmost—the customer. The corporate leader must not have concern for himself or herself, but he or she must be without bias and malice in their decisions and actions.

§ Courage is a necessary trait for a truly effective corporate leader. The courageousness of a leader reflects in where he is on the corporate battlefield, how he or she guides and motivates the subordinates.

§ Discipline prevents him from growing soft. Even at rest, the good corporate leader is always alert. The corporate leader should instill high standards in himself or herself as well as in their subordinates, both management and non-management. Low standards will cause a loss of a sense of urgency, and therefore overall readiness. “Laxness begets defeat.”

5. “Law,” or policy, procedures, rules, regulations, and the like are the controls that hold all of the other four elements together. It is the amount of organization, or housekeeping, the communications structure, the chain of command, and level of logistics and other support.

§ Free of clutter

§ Good communication, backed by strong communication channels

§ Urgency in amount of support and support structure

§ Control of expenses

§ Without an efficient system of moving essentials, the army will be weakened.

§ Effective management of other resources

§ The wise corporate leader considers the costs of doing battle closely, spending money and consuming resources like they were his or her own

§ Supplies should be replenished from the opponent’s provisions whenever possible

Every corporate officer, senior, middle, and supervisory manager must know and be able to apply these concepts, for they are supremely necessary in succeeding in any corporate campaign.

• Knowing and being able to apply these elements lessens the risk to valuable resources, personnel, capital, and the image of the firm.
• There is no substitute for a well-planned operation
• There exists a critical importance in training and educating members of management at all levels.
• Training and education were highly valued.
• One does not attain the position as a corporate officer without possessing acute awareness of the principles of business, industry, and warfare.
• One common cross-cultural denominator is that successful leaders and successful business units are fanatical about training their employees.

Be able to compare, contrast, and calculate these Five Principles against any and all organizations/firms involved in any campaign of corporate warfare.

• Must be unbiased
• Must be able to solve or otherwise adapt to any shortcomings that are found
• Be able to adjust the strategic elements so that they fall in your favor
• If the corporate leader knows the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent, then he or she can attack with great speed, and defend with great mystery.
• Calculating requires quantitative methods
• Contrasting requires qualitative methods

The corporate officer or manager who does not properly practice corporate warfare should be terminated from the firm, for they do not understand the way of corporate warfare. Ignoring them will prove detrimental to the operation. Given the choice between a corporate officer who practices tried-and-true concepts in warfare versus one who does not, a good human resources manager or manager closely involved with hiring should not hire the haphazard one, but the one who sees the full value of planning, purpose, strategy, and tactics.

Intelligence Types in Corporate Warfare

There are primarily five intelligence disciplines which significantly support corporate operations:

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)

Image Intelligence (IMINT)

Communications Intelligence (CI)

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

The objective of most corporate campaigns, highlighting specifically the areas of marketing, advertising, selling, legal, mergers and acquisitions, and other key areas where the intent is to influence humans with a specific level of buy-in.

The most effective source of intelligence gathering is Human Intelligence.

Human Intelligence can be collected using a variety of methods.

§ Survey persons in the target market or industrial segment and debrief those persons who have recently had interpersonal contact with either. refugees.

§ Debrief new employees who are or formerly have been part of the target market.

§ Perform controlled collection.

§ Intelligence gathering by observation

§ Form strategic alliances with those individuals and organizations inside the target market, industry, or sector of industry along with members of the local population, obtaining intelligence information from any number of groups friendly to the corporation.

Corporate-based psychological warfare and other highly-controlled forces originating from the vision of corporate senior management utilize Human Intelligence developed from primary sources such as from controlled collection, Communications Intelligence, surveys as described above, debriefings as described before, and from other defensive or offensive Human Intelligence corporate warfare operations. To support these activities, Human Intelligence must be timely and accurate.

Intelligence information gathered from individuals or business units within a rival company, industry, or that hold key positions in the target market often provide intelligence-gathering business units with significant insights into the psychological situation within one of these specific areas or other target group. Under the proper circumstances, these individuals can also be used to develop products that can later be used in psychological operations. They can also be extremely valuable in testing, pre-testing, or post-testing said products.

Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)

Signals Intelligence is developed from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of information derived from intercepted electromagnetic emissions. Signals Intelligence sub-fields include Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). By integrating these forms of intelligence with intelligence from other resources, accurate targeting and threat data can be obtained and realized.

Signals Intelligence data supports psychological operations by providing products extracted from locating, monitoring, and transcribing threat communications and by intercepting non-communications releasers. These assets provide information and intelligence that help reveal activities or plans of opposing forces so that psychological operations can assist the corporate leader in developing effective countermeasures.

Image Intelligence (IMINT)

Image Intelligence comes from radar, photographic, infrared, and electro-optic imagery.

Psychological warfare analysts use Image Intelligence in varied ways. It helps locate and determine the capabilities and operational status of geographic locations of assets that the opposition has that may be a threat within a target geographic area or demographic.

By analyzing imagery of the spatial location and architecture of key structures, Imagery intelligence analysts can determine the ethnic or religious composition of a town or village. Other uses for Imagery Intelligence products include identifying and evaluating operational capabilities of transportation and/or logistics networks, factories, and other rival structures or systems.

Imagery Intelligence analysts use Image Intelligence to confirm or deny acts of acts of sabotage, demonstrations, and work slow-downs that are either the original PSYOP objective or an impact indicator of a PSYOP campaign or specific product.

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)

Technical Intelligence consists of comparing Scientific and Technical Intelligence and battlefield TECHINT. Technical Intelligence provides business unit personnel with intelligence about other business unit or corporate technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of business unit or corporate technological materiel. Corporate battlefield TECHINT can provide the tactical-level corporate leader with countermeasures to neutralize and defeat rival systems and materiel. Furthermore, in-depth Technical Intelligence can assist corporate leaders at levels higher than tactical in formulating business unit or tactical strategy.

Psychological operations-involved business units can use Technical Intelligence to focus their efforts on critical, highly technical threat business units.

Counter Intelligence (CI)

Counter Intelligence detects, evaluates, counteracts, or prevents the intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism of rival corporations, business units, or other entities. It determines security vulnerabilities and recommends countermeasures. Counter Intelligence operations support operational security, deception, and business unit protection.